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1.1  Introduction 
The goal of this research is to determine the impact on government budgets 
of  predicted  changes in demographic  structure in the United States over the 
next 90 years. A major part of the demographic shifts is due to the aging of 
the post-World  War I1 baby-boom generation. Another important factor is the 
decrease in the age-specific mortality rates that has occurred and is predicted 
to continue. Many government programs are targeted to specific age groups in 
our society, and therefore we feel that the impact of the population’s changing 
age structure on these programs’  budgetary  costs is an interesting research 
question. We were motivated to look at this issue to help address the question 
of the ability of governments to sustain programs already in place and to imple- 
ment new ones, within the general scale of government of the recent past. 
Our basic approach identifies those government programs for which benefi- 
ciaries can be distinguished. Some of these are traditional transfer programs, 
but others (such as retirement programs and education) are often not character- 
ized as such. We calculate the cost to taxpayers of maintaining the 1986 level 
of age/family-structure-specific  payments for each of 22 government programs 
for which we could identify beneficiaries.  We estimate these costs for 1990, 
and at 20-year intervals  from 2000 to 2080. These programs include Social 
Security, Medicare, Medicaid, education, and a range of income support, wel- 
fare, and work-related government programs. Our estimates include payments 
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made by federal, state, and local governments. In total, the programs we exam- 
ine account for about 40 percent of all government expenditure. We find that 
maintaining the benefit levels for each age-specific family type would require 
quite dramatic increases in the total funds allocated to these programs. 
1.2  Population Projections 
The projected number of males and females in different age cohorts between 
1990 and 2080 are shown in table  I.  1. The data are based on Social Security 
Administration  (SSA) population  projections  used to forecast the future in- 
come and expenditures  of  the  Social  Security  system. The baseline  for the 
projections is an estimate of the Social Security Area’ population in  1987 by 
age, sex, and marital status and of the pattern of  existing marriages by age of 
husband  and wife. Finally, population projections  for future years are simu- 
lated based on assumptions about future birth rates, death rates, marriage and 
divorce  rates,  and  net  immigration  rates. The SSA considers  three  separate 
population  projections.  The data in  table  1.1 are based  on the intermediate 
“best guess” projection  of the SSA.? We  adopt this projection  as a working 
hypothesis about population growth. 
There is a great deal of uncertainty about the demographic projections con- 
tained in table  1.1. The SSA recognizes this uncertainty  by  producing  three 
alternative scenarios, including an “optimistic” and a “pessimistic” forecast in 
addition to the “best guess” numbers we have used here. In contrast, Manton, 
Stallard, and Singer (chap. 2 in this volume) provide an alternative approach 
to handling the uncertainty about demographic trends, particularly that due to 
the uncertain evolution of age-specific mortality rates. They estimate the effect 
of 10 different risk factors (e.g., smoking, cholesterol level, pulse rate) on mor- 
tality and compute the age-specific death rates for people who optimally con- 
trol these risk factors. They find that control of these risk factors can have a 
major impact on mortality and, hence, on the future age structure of the popu- 
lation. 
Our basic calculations utilize the “best guess” demographic projections of 
the SSA. The population of different age cohorts with these forecasts are de- 
picted in figures  1.1 and  1.2 for 1990-2080.  Several important demographic 
changes are evident in these figures. First, the population aged 15-44  remains 
roughly constant between  1990 and 2080. Because of our constant payout as- 
sumption, government programs such as AFDC that focus on these age cohorts 
will experience little growth  in total outlays. Similarly, the population  aged 
45-64  increases  between  1990 and  2020 but  then  levels  out  and  remains 
1.  The Social Security Area  comprises residents of  the  50 states, the District of  Columbia, 
heno  Rico, Virgin Islands, Guam, American Samoa, armed forces and armed forces dependents 
overseas, and other citizens overseas. 
2. Described in U.S.  SSA (1989).  We use “alternative 11,” the middle case of the three developed 
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Table 1.1  Population Projections (millions) 
Age Cohort 
15-24  25-34  35-44  45-54  55-64  65-74  75-84  85+  Total 
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Suurce: US.  SSA (1989) 
roughly constant between 2020 and 2080. Thus, employment-related programs 
that target the labor-force population will experience little growth in outlays 
beyond 2020. 
Second, the aging of the postwar “baby boomers” is evident throughout the 
period of our analysis. Between  1990 and 2000, the 45-54  age cohort grows 
by 45 percent. Between 2000 and 2020, the 55-64  cohort grows by 72 percent, 
and the 65-74  cohort by 66 percent. Between 2020 and 2040, the 75-84  cohort 
grows by 77 percent, and the 85 + cohort by 84 percent. Beyond 2040, popula- 
tion growth remains roughly constant except for the 85+ cohort. 
Third, the fraction of the adult population over age 65 grows in both absolute 
and relative terms. Table 1.2 shows the percentage of men and women over age 
65, over 75, and over 85, relative to the adult population of men and women. 
Between  1990 and 2040, the fraction of adults over 65 relative to total adults 
increases from 18 to 29 percent for women and from 13 to 23 percent for men. 
The increase is even more dramatic for the “very old.” Between 1990  and 2040, 
the fraction of adults over 85 relative to all adults increases from 2 to 6 percent 16  John B. Shoven, Michael D. Topper, and David A. Wise 
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Fig. 1.1  Projected female population shares by age cohort 
1990  2000  2020  2040  2060  2080 
Year 
15-44  Ages 45-64  Ages 65-74 
75-84  -  --1  Ages 85+ 
Fig. 1.2  Projected male population shares by age cohort 
for women and from 1 to 3 percent for men. Thus, government programs that 
provide services for older individuals will experience substantial upward pres- 
sure on costs. 
As an extreme alternative assumption, we can examine the implications of 
the Manton, Stallard, and Singer (hereafter MSS; chap. 2 in this volume) model 
in which people adopt optimal control of risk factors after 20 years (i.e., their 17  The Impact of the Demographic Transition on Government Spending 
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Fig. 1.3  Projected “optimal” female population shares by age cohort 
1990  2000  2020  2040  2060  2080 
Year 
m  Ages 15-44  Ages 45-64  Ages 65-74 
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Fig. 1.4  Projected “optimal” male population shares by age cohort 
behavior dramatically changes 20 years from now). The resulting population 
projections are shown in figures 1.3  and 1.4. Comparisons with figures 1.1 and 
1.2 show dramatic differences, particularly for the very advanced ages. For 
example, whereas the middle SSA forecast projects a population of  11.1 mil- 
lion women aged 85 or older in 2080, the MSS forecast with optimal risk factor 
control is 39.7 million. The difference between the two types of  forecasts is 18  John B. Shoven, Michael D. Topper, and David A. Wise 
even more dramatic for elderly males. The point of presenting the MSS num- 
bers is not to suggest that they may represent the actual outcome but to illus- 
trate how sensitive demographic projections are to the control of risk factors. 
1.3  Expected Program Payments 
Expected program payments from the government to households are shown 
in table 1.3 by  age of household head, household marital status, and program 
category. These data are for 1986 and are expressed in dollars per household. 
The numbers  thus combine participation  probabilities  with  average  receipt 
conditional on participation. Large values can arise from high program partici- 
pation rates and/or large payments to program participants. Government trans- 
fer payments were grouped into eight categories: (1) Social Security, (2)  other 
retirement  income-includes  federal  civil  service  pensions,  railroad  retire- 
ment income, and pensions  from state and local governments, (3) Medicare, 
(4) Medicaid, (5) work-related  programs-includes  workers  compensation 
and state and other unemployment compensation, (6) welfare and income sup- 
port programs-includes  AFDC, WIC, food  stamps, Supplemental  Security 
Income, general  assistance,  and  other  welfare  programs,  (7) military  pro- 
grams-includes  military  retirement  pensions,  veterans’  compensation, and 
GI bill benefits, (8) education-includes  public  provision  of elementary and 
secondary schooling and federal, state, and local support of higher education. 
Appendix A contains a brief description of each program. Appendix B presents 
the expected transfer program data disaggregated by individual program. 
The primary source for these estimates was  1986 data from the Survey of 
Income Programs and Participation (SIPP; U.S. Bureau of the Census 1986). 
Program  participation  rates and average payments per participant  for Social 
Security, other retirement  income, work-related programs, welfare programs, 
Table 1.2  Adult Population over Age 65 (%) 
Over 65  Over 75  Over 85 
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Table 1.3  Expected Government Payments per Household by Program Category in 
1986 (1986 $) 
Age Cohort 
~ 
15-25  25-35  35-45  45-55  55-65  65-75  75-85 
Single males 
Social Security  49.01  70.00  136.02  356.04  1,231.72  5,190.20  5,257.96 
Other retirement  0.00  4.79  0.00  34.32  298.15  1,650.04  1,571.71 
Medicare  5.58  19.00  39.25  152.00  282.06  1,785.21  2,648.10 
Medicaid  94.93  118.47  162.70  184.02  203.53  294.64  700.66 
Welfare  29.22  92.32  231.97  182.13  234.48  250.89  147.10 
Work-related  58.35  182.97  271.32  224.50  116.53  I .26  0.00 
Military  12.93  26.88  106.49  646.25  864.01  1,206.04  186.02 
Total  250.02  514.43  947.75  1,779.25  3.230.48  10,378.28  IOSI  1.55 
Social Security  43.22  82.88  296.7  340.7  1,426.83  4,590.14  4,647.54 
Other retirement  0.00  1.63  13.68  183.9  575.44  989.36  992.31 
Medicare  7.06  25.11  49.44  148.98  272.33  1,637.97  2,456.49 
Medicaid  213.13  472.53  611.37  327.33  211.91  294.64  700.66 
Welfare  320.80  1,121.65  1,744.98  954.82  298.12  283.83  232.82 
Work-related  23.15  75.48  191.03  108.04  81.91  10.35  0.00 
Military  5.92  13.18  37.21  118.43  177.76  146.96  95.12 
Total  613.28  1.792.46  2,944.51  2,182.20  3,044.29  7,953.25  9.124.94 
Social Security  11.79  44.87  105.55  437.76  3,064.57  9,237.4  8,847.57 
Other retirement  0.00  5.1  51.36  301.77  1,741.77  2.202.79  2,471.99 
Medicare  0.00  3.96  21.44  94.60  217.91  3.513.87  5,142.88 
Medicaid  263.82  270.29  317.92  354.07  407.15  568.68  1,254.32 
Welfare  247.7  266.72  250.38  123.99  107.36  97.62  164.97 
Work-related  268.4  34 I .02  2 15.55  236. I1  203.13  27.92  0.00 
Military  66.12  82.15  208.26  756.57  800.14  705.47  132.72 
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Nore: Cell entries are expected program  payments per household derived from the SIPP (US.  Bureau of 
the Census 1986). Age cohort for married couples based on age of husband. 
and military programs were obtained by averaging across all SIPP households 
in each age/marital-status class. In the averaging process, we utilized the popu- 
lation weight for each household in the survey. SIPP data on program participa- 
tion rates in Medicare and Medicaid were supplemented  by  Health Care Fi- 
nancing Administration (HCFA) data on average age-group-specific Medicare 
and Medicaid payments.3 Expected program payments for these seven catego- 
ries were expressed on a per household basis. 
The concentration of transfer payment receipts among the older age cohorts 
is evident in the "total" rows in table 1.3.  For example, on average, single males 
aged  15-44  receive  less  than  $1,000 from these  transfer  programs.  Single 
3. Medicaid payments  obtained from data in U.S. Department of Health and Human  Services 
(1989).  Medicare payments obtained from U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (1986). 20  John B. Shoven, Michael D. Topper, and David A. Wise 
males over age 65 receive an average of over $10,000. Obviously, a change in 
the distribution  of  the population  toward  the  more elderly  age  cohorts  will 
cause current age-specific programs to become more expensive, if maintained. 
The final category of program payments is education. The education  data 
include expenditure for elementary, secondary,  and higher education  by  the 
federal, state, and local governments. These data were obtained from the Sta- 
tistical Abstract of the United States, 1987 (US.  Bureau of the Census 1988) 
by dividing government educational expenses by the number of children in the 
relevant  age groups4  Expected per child education  payments  in  1987 were 
$2,875 for ages 5-9,  $3,079 for ages 10-14, $2,326 for ages 15-19, and $1,501 
for ages 20-24. 
We  have  not  been  able to  assign  all  government  expenditure to  specific 
households. The list of unallocated government expenditure includes such ma- 
jor categories as national defense, agricultural policies,  interest, capital out- 
lays, police and fire protection, public parks and land management, and general 
administration. While the programs that we do consider include most transfer 
programs,  they do not  include  all, because  of  limited  data  availability. The 
largest missing transfer program  is public housing;  information  on it is not 
available from the SIPP data source. 
1.4  The “Constant Average Deal” Modeling Approach 
Our modeling approach is to calculate the cost to taxpayers of maintaining 
program payments at 1986 levels as the demographic structure of the popula- 
tion changes. That is, we assume that the “average deal” that a household of a 
particular type receives in 1986 is a predictor of the average deal a household 
of the same type will receive in future years. Thus, there are two reasons that 
total  outlays change in  our calculations.  First,  there  is  general  population 
growth. The SSA projects that the total adult population over age 15 will in- 
crease from 201.5 million in 1990 to 266.6 million in 2040, an increase of 32 
percent. In the absence of any changes to the age structure of the population 
our assumption of  a constant  average deal would  suggest that total program 
payments would also increase by 32 percent. In fact, as described in section 
1.2, the relative number of older individuals is expected to increase throughout 
the period. Second, for those government programs where the pattern of pay- 
outs varies by age, the shift in the age distribution provides an additional source 
of change in total outlays. 
4. We make the simple assumption that total elementaryisecondary expenditures were evenly 
distributed across children aged 5-17  and that total  higher education expenditures were evenly 
distributed across children aged 18-24. This provided an estimate of total educational expenditure 
for four age groups: ages 5-9.  ages  10-14,  ages  15-19,  and ages 20-24.  Per capita education 
payments were then calculated by  dividing age-group total expenditures by the total  1987 popula- 
tion in each age group. 21  The Impact of  the Demographic Transition on Government Spending 
This modeling approach essentially assumes that there is no behavioral re- 
sponse on the part of either the government or households as population growth 
and demographic shifts alter the level and distribution of total outlays. That is, 
we assume that program funding levels are maintained  in real terms at 1986 
levels and that a household in a specific age/marital class in each future year is 
identical to a household in that age/marital class in 1986. Thus, this procedure 
provides a simple baseline for evaluating the consequences of maintaining pro- 
gram benefits in the face of dramatic demographic changes. We certainly are 
not forecasting that government budgets will evolve along the time path that 
our numbers indicate. Rather, our approach is the standard “what if” approach, 
which is useful in debating the appropriate responses to the changing demo- 
graphic and economic environment. 
1.5  Estimates of Future Government Payments 
We calculate the total payments for each program to each family structure/ 
age cohort in future years by multiplying the 1986 expected program payment 
matrix by the population matrix in each year. The results of  this procedure for 
each forecast year are shown separately for each age/family-structure group in 
Appendix  C. Table  1.4 aggregates these data across age cohorts  and family 
structures. With the SSA population forecasts, the total cost of  all of the pro- 
grams is projected to grow from $669 billion in 1990 to $1,106 billion in 2040. 
This 65.4 percent increase in cost compares with the anticipated 32.2 percent 
growth in the age 15+ population and an increase of  27.5 percent in the total 
population. Clearly the expected changes in the age structure of the population 
have large cost consequences. We can examine the projected cost changes by 
major program category. 
1  S.1  Social Security 
Table  1.4 indicates that the Old Age, Survivors, and Disability portion of 
Social Security accounts for about $209 billion of  the $437.4 billion increase 
in the total cost increase of maintaining age-specific benefits. That still leaves 
the other programs accounting for 52  percent of the expenditure increase. Con- 
trary to our assumption, the SSA does not intend to maintain its age-specific 
deal. In particular, the age of eligibility for full retirement benefits will gradu- 
ally increase from 65 to 67. This will provide a relatively small offset against 
the increasing costs faced by this program. 
1.5.2  Medicare 
Medicare costs show a significantly higher growth rate than Social Security 
costs and contribute almost $100 billion to the increase. The more rapid rate 
of  increase  in  Medicare  costs is due to its higher  concentration  of  benefits 22  John B. Shoven, Michael D. Topper, and David A. Wise 
Table 1.4  Projected Total Payments by Program Category (billion 1986 $) 
Category  1990  2000  2020  2040  2060  2080 
Social Security  203.41  229.39  337.75  412.44  428.34 
Other retirement  59.34  67.32  99.33  114.86  117.76 
Medicare  77.94  89.86  128.84  175.50  183.07 
Medicaid  50.55  57.95  69.49  86.34  90.10 
Welfare  44.03  49.78  52.61  55.44  55.87 
Work-related  20.05  22.10  23.62  23.32  23.24 
Military  33.29  39.82  53.32  54.56  55.69 
Education  180.18  189.29  183.83  183.93  183.93 
Total  668.80  745.52  948.79  1,106.38  1,138.00 










among the elderly. Recall that Social Security includes disability benefits and 
survivor benefits, which are often received by the nonelderly. 
Our calculation assumes that the age-specific cost of Medicare remains at 
1986 levels. Therefore, we do not project that the relative cost of medical care 
will increase (even though most forecasters would predict that), and we implic- 
itly assume that the average health status of individuals of a particular age will 
remain constant. Both assumptions  are made for simplicity and to provide a 
baseline for discussion. However, both  are open to question and may not be 
realistic. The relative cost of health care has been increasing at something like 
a 4 percent rate for at least a decade, and that trend is likely to continue. Part 
of the reason is that new and more expensive treatment procedures  are con- 
stantly being developed. Second, one might think, for example, that the aver- 
age 75-year-old male will be healthier in 2040 than in 1990, corresponding to 
his increase in life expectancy  and improvements that  can be anticipated  in 
medical  technology.  However, the improvement  in medical  technology  cuts 
both ways in terms of the average health status of elderly individuals. While it 
is reasonable  to assume that some elderly will be healthier  and have health 
status equivalent to that of younger individuals in the previous generation, oth- 
ers may survive into the older age cohorts because of improved medical tech- 
nology, but their health status may still be relatively  poor for their age. There 
is some evidence (Poterba and Summers 1987) that the two tendencies offset 
each other and that the average age-specific health status remains constant even 
as the life expectancies of  men and women increase. 
1.5.3  Medicaid 
Medicaid  is  a  state-administered,  largely  federally  funded, program  of 
health insurance for those in poverty. As displayed in table  1.3, the expected 
payments do not differ dramatically by age, with the exception of the two old- 
est age categories, 75-85  and 85  +.  Medicaid pays for a great deal of the long- 
term care for many of the institutionalized elderly. The costs of institutional- 
ized care are such that if you are not in poverty at the time of  admission, you 23  The Impact of  the Demographic Transition on Government Spending 
may well be after a period of residence. The result of Medicaid’s high expected 
payments to the very old and of the projected growth in the number of people 
in these age cohorts is a 70.8 percent increase in the cost of Medicaid between 
1990 and 2040. 
1.5.4  Education 
Federal, state, and local expenditure on education remains roughly constant 
at $180-$190  billion between 1990 and 2040. This is a direct consequence of 
the projection  that the number of  children aged 5-19  will change very little 
during this period. Some observers have noted that reduced spending on educa- 
tion will partially offset increases in government spending for the elderly. Our 
projections suggest that educational spending will remain stable and will not 
offer such an offset. We do find that projected growth in spending for programs 
like Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid will reduce education’s share of 
total government outlays between  1990 and 2040. 
1.5.5  Other Programs 
Welfare and work-related  programs  show slower growth rates than  Social 
Security and the medical programs, with spending on welfare growing by  25 
percent  and spending on work-related  programs growing by  16 percent be- 
tween  1990 and 2040. The largest expected welfare payments are received by 
single female heads  of  household  aged 25-45.  The largest expected  work- 
related  payments  are received  by  married  couples and  single male heads  of 
household aged 25-65.  Because these groups are not projected to grow as rap- 
idly as the population  over age 65, welfare and work-related  programs do not 
have a major impact on the overall trend in government  spending. In  1990, 
total payments for Social Security were 4.6 times greater than total payments 
for welfare and  10.1 times greater than total payments for work-related  pro- 
grams. By 2040, the gap between Social Security and the other programs wid- 
ens; Social Security payments are 7.4 times greater than welfare payments and 
17.7 times greater than work-related payments. These trends suggest that even 
major cutbacks in welfare and work-related programs will do little to stem the 
projected increase in government program payments to households. 
The results of table 1.4 are illustrated in figure 1.5. The graph highlights the 
importance of Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid in the “constant-deal’’ 
cost growth between  1990 and 2040. The three programs  account for $343 
billion of the total increase of $437 billion. 
The potential for even larger increases in the cost of these three programs if 
elderly populations exceed the SSA’s  “best guess” forecast is shown in table 
1.5 and also in figure 1.6, which show the implications of the Manton, Stallard, 
and Singer “optimal risk factor” population projections. Reiterating the caveat 
that these are extreme upper bounds of what might happen, one sees that the 
cost of the programs examined goes from $65 1.4 billion in 1990 to almost $1.8 
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Fig. 1.5  Projected total payments by program category 
Table 1.5  Projected Total Outlays Using “Optimal” Population Projections 































2040  2060  2080 
707.589  770.832  759.473 
360.909  403.388  398.329 
180.567  202.319  200.398 
335.974  347.857  340.258 
183.927  183.931  183.092 
1,768.967  1,908.329  l,88  I .55  1 
Sources: “Optimal” population projection from US. SSA (1989); U.S.  Bureau of  the  Census 
(1986). 
grams levels off after 2040, but there is no projected reduction in the required 
total outlays. 
Tables 1.6 and  1.7 show the projected  per capita outlays in each forecast 
year for the two alternative population projections. The per capita basis in both 
tables is the projected number of adults between the ages of 20 and 64. In table 
1.6, based on the SSA’s  “best guess” population forecasts, per capita outlays 
grow 37.7 percent between 2000 and 2040. The per capita expenditure grows 
“only” 6 percent in the 40 years from 2040 to 2080. The jump in per capita 25  The Impact of the Demographic Transition on Government Spending 
OTHER PROGRAMS 
EDUCATION 
Fig. 1.6  Projected total payments by program category for “optimal” population 
projection 
Table 1.6  Projected per Capita Outlays by Program Category (1986 $) 
Category  1990 
Social Security  1,340 
Medicare  513 
Medicaid  333 
Welfare, work-  1,033 
related, and 
military 
Education  1,187 
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2020  2040  2060  2080 
1,862  2,3  16  2,4  18  2,494 
710  985  1,033  1,084 
383  485  509  536 
1,262  1,393  1,426  1,444 
1,014  1,033  1,038  1,03  I 
5,232  6,212  6,423  6,589 
Note: Projected per capita outlays were calculated by dividing projected total outlays from table 
1.4 by the total population between ages 20-64  in each year. 
costs is much sharper with the Manton, Stallard, and Singer numbers, growing 
126.5 percent between 2000 and 2040 and 15 percent thereafter (between 2040 
and 2080). 
1.6  Summary 
The US. federal government has found it impossible to balance its budget 
in recent  years. Our conclusion is that the budgetary pressure caused by  the 26  John B. Shoven, Michael D. Topper, and David A. Wise 
Table 1.7  Projected per Capita Outlays by Program Category Using “Optimal” 
Population Projection (1986 $) 
Category  1990  2000  2020  2040  2060  2080 
Social Security  1,349  1,368  2,279  4,044  4,607  4,692 
Medicare  513  536  1,022  2,063  2,411  2,46  1 
Medicaid  346  358  561  1,032  1,209  1,238 
Welfare, work-  1,076  1,063  1,401  1,920  2,079  2,102 
related, and 
military 
Education  1,255  1,138  1,027  I ,05  I  1,099  1,131 
Total  4,538  4,463  6,296  10,110  I 1,404  I 1,623 
Note: Projected per capita outlays were calculated by dividing projected total outlays from table 
1.5 by the total population between ages 20-64  in each year. 
aging of the population over the next 50 years will exacerbate this problem. 
The ability of  the government to embark on new spending programs will un- 
doubtedly be impeded. 
We have purposely made the unrealistic assumption that the age-specific per 
capita cost of  government health programs  will remain  constant. Even with 
that assumption and with the relatively conservative demographic assumptions 
in the SSA’s “best guess” population  forecasts, we calculate  a 65.4 percent 
($437 billion) increase in the cost of the programs we examine, by 2040. With 
the extreme “optimal risk factor” population projections, the total cost of  our 
programs  grows by  well over $1  trillion in the next  50 years. Clearly, with 
either scenario, these projections  have serious consequences. First, the con- 
stant age-specific generosity  of these programs will be difficult  to maintain. 
There will be strong pressures to cut the benefits of these programs, many of 
which are referred to as “entitlements.” Second, new initiatives with budgetary 
costs will be crowded out by the growing expense of the existing programs. 
The growth in expenditures of these programs is dominated by Social Secu- 
rity, Medicare, and Medicaid. Even if age-specific costs can be contained for 
these programs (a big “if”), their total costs will grow enormously as a result 
of the aging of  our society. While it is conceivable that economic growth will 
permit us to afford these programs, most, if not all, of the fiscal dividend pro- 
vided by  growth over the next 50 years will have to be devoted to financing 
these programs. If we do not contain age-specific costs or if we do not experi- 
ence robust economic growth, then the pressures to curtail these government 
programs will be overwhelming. 27  The Impact of the Demographic Transition on Government Spending 
Appendix A 
Government Transfer Program Descriptions 
Name5  Description 
Social Security Income 
Other retirement income 
Federal civil service 
Railroad retirement income 
State government pensions 










Welfare and Income Support 
Programs 
AFDC 
Federal: old age, survivors, and disability 
benefits; based on prior earnings and 
payroll contributions 
For retired railroad workers 
Federally administered subsidized health 
insurance; most hospital and medical costs 
for persons over 65 or disabled 
State administered; federal grants made to 
states; health-care coverage to persons 
receiving federally supported public 
assistance; AFDC families automatically 
eligible 
State-administered compensation for 
injured workers, also for some work- 
related illnesses, notably black lung 
disease; composed of cash, medical, and 
rehabilitation benefits; total 1986 
compensation = $17.8 billion 
State administered; eligibility based on 
past earnings and work experience; each 
state has broad discretion; funded by 
payroll tax 
State administered with federal matching 
shares; on average, burden is 55 percent 
federal, 40 percent state, and 5 percent 
local 
5. Community health centers, Department of Veteran Affairs health-care system, Indian Health 
Service, low-income housing, and social service block grants are excluded from this analysis. 28  John B. Shoven, Michael D. Topper, and David A. Wise 
Special Supplemental  Food and food vouchers for low income, 





Foster childcare payments 






GI Bill Benefits 
Education 
children up to age  5 
Federally funded; households receive 
monthly allowances of  food stamps based 
on income and household size; other food 
programs include child and elderly 
nutrition (such as school lunch program) 
and distribution of  surplus food 
Federal program for poor people aged 65 
and over, blind, or disabled; means tested 
Means-tested state programs for the poor; 
concentrated in big cities; combination of 
cash, medical, and hospital benefits; large 
variance across states 
Federal program channeled through the 
states for all foster-care children meeting 
AFDC eligibility 
Paid to veterans or survivors with annual 
income below a certain level, and over 65 
or disabled; total  1988 payments = $4.3 
billion 
Compensation for injury, disability, or 
death paid to veterans or survivors; 
received by one-thirteenth of veterans; 
total 1988 cost = $8.7 billion 
Educational assistance for veterans; 1989 
total = $5 11 million 
Federal, state, and local spending for 
education, including elementary, 
secondary, and postsecondary education 29  The Impact of the Demographic Transition on Government Spending 
Appendix B 
Expected Transfer Payments in I986 (I  986 $) 
Table lB.l  Single Females 
Age Cohort 





35-45  45-55  55-65  65-75  75-85  85+ 
413.54  189.35  16.81  1.02  2.39  0 
296.7  340.7  1,426.82  4,590.14  4,647.54  4,279.27 
0  0  12.03  139.88  126.99  100.22 




































14.72  70.69  143.07  58.82  59.44  0.23  0  0 
2.65  10.82  37.31  106.05  170.6  112.25  69.51  93.45 











71.8  45.81  27.02  3.71  0  0 
0.67  0  2.29  0  0  0 
8.51  5.69  0  12.59  6.93  1.76 
313.24  216.25  75.57  29.25  26.82  17.03 
847.84  273.42  6.48  0  0  0 
0  0  13.68  146.78  272.31  369.4  301.83  206.86 
49.44  148.98  272.33  1,637.97  2,456.49  2,851.89 
611.37  327.33  211.91  294.64  700.66  1742 
0  12.38  7.16  34.71  25.61  0 
















0  0  0  0  0  0 
3.69  1.4  0  0  0  0 
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Table 1B.2  Single Males 
Age Cohort 

































1.1  6.97  29.46  22.58  4.96  0 
49.01  70  136.02  356.04  1.231.72  5.190.2 
0  0  0  0  11.76 
20.54  48.51  88.21  108.73  163.07 
48.07  123.03  172.61  119.1  81.88 
1.06  10.31  78.7  215.5  397.64 
10.28  59.94  98.71  105.4  34.65 
3.46  19.45  37.71  15.06  42.07 
0  0  0  4.13  0 
0.54  0.42  0  0  0.58 
2.83  12.14  42.52  31.63  23.8 
0.75  4.83  34.07  0  0 
0  4.79  0  0  170.6 
5.58  19.00  39.25  152.00  282.06 
94.93  118.47  162.7  184.02  203.53 
1.53  0  9.69  414.94  466.37 
0  0  0  24.19  84.59 
0  0  0  10.13  31.2 
10.34  16.57  18.1  15.81  0 
0  0  0  0  0 
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Table 1B.3  Married Couples 
Age Cohort 

































105.3  63.63  58.56  30.47  10.04  6.92 
11.79  44.87  105.55  437.76  3.064.57  9.237.4 
0  1.95  0  5.33  174.88 
0  10.73  26.61  21.4  61.6 
189.64  231.93  174.35  141.19  88.86 
27.39  45.09  59.1  89.84  326.53 
76.84  107.88  36.7  87.59  114.17 
3.64  10.44  6.68  8.14  8.83 
3.37  10.54  5.23  7.29  3.65 
0.47  0.63  10.73  1.82  0.44 
86.28  74.82  53.52  42.37  20.49 
23.97  88.41  87.22  12.27  2.19 
0  0  17.31  98.52  801.23 
0.00  3.96  21.44  94.60  217.91 
263.82  270.29  317.92  354.07  407.15 
24.56  7.21  128.98  656.43  468.37 
0  3.15  25.3  145.45  564.54 
0  0  8.75  52.47  201.12 
14.17  29.85  20.18  10.3  5.24 
24.67  7.52  1.83  0.23  0.12 




















0  0 
8,847.57  8,582.22 
181.12  175.65 
129.86  689.04 
0  0 
78.7  149.54 
0  0 
2.89  0 
0  0 
14.29  0 
17.93  19.77 
0  0 
938  1.067.23 
5,142.88  5,928.77 
1,254.32  3,246.84 
54.02  0 
1.029.28  0 
323.59  0 
0  0 
0  0 
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Appendix C 
Total Transfer Payments (billion $) 
Age Cohort 
Under25  25-35  35-45  45-55  55-65  65-75  75-85  85+  Total 
Year I990 
1.94  3.64  6.60  33.82 
0.13  0.81  3.86  17.65 
0.44  0.74  1.86  3.36 
8.34  8.37  5.25  4.64 
13.05  13.19  4.89  2.40 
6.84  5.39  3.39  2.26 
1.43  3.73  9.93  9.18 
0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
32.18  35.88  35.78  73.31 
1.66  4.56  9.76  38.33 
0.11  0.89  5.48  19.96 
0.38  0.94  2.86  3.84 
7.03  10.09  7.70  5.27 
10.96  16.85  7.84  2.76 
5.79  6.60  5.00  2.57 
1.21  4.28  14.42  10.41 
0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
27.13  44.22  53.06  83.13 
1.79  3.86  9.79  63.80 
0.12  0.77  5.29  32.32 
0.41  0.80  2.93  6.86 
7.61  8.56  7.60  8.86 
11.93  14.00  7.73  5.10 
6.22  5.68  5.07  4.33 
1.29  3.71  14.63  18.27 
0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
29.37  37.37  53.05  139.54 
1.72  3.84  10.57  55.98 
0.11  0.77  5.68  28.49 
0.40  0.80  3.18  5.93 
7.31  8.50  8.19  7.76 
11.44  13.81  8.40  4.35 
5.99  5.69  5.47  3.80 
1.24  3.71  15.77  16.09 
0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
28.22  37.12  57.25  122.40 
1.70  3.95  10.20  56.15 
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Age Cohort 

































0.39  0.82  3.06  5.94 
7.18  8.73  7.91  7.79 
11.22  14.24  8.00  4.34 
5.91  5.84  5.29  3.82 
1.23  3.80  15.28  16.26 
0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
27.73  38.16  55.23  122.86 
1.70  3.92  10.06  57.71 
0.11  0.78  5.42  29.33 
0.39  0.82  3.01  6.11 
7.21  8.67  7.79  8.01 
11.26  14.13  7.83  4.46 
5.93  5.80  5.22  3.93 
1.23  3.78  15.10  16.76 
0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
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COInInent  Michael D. Hurd 
It can be useful to think of total government spending as a weighted average 
of per capita spending with weights given by the population that draws on the 
programs. This is particularly true for a range of entitlement programs such as 
Social Security, because the rules roughly fix individual benefits and the sys- 
Michael D. Hurd is professor of economics at State University of New York at Stony Brook and 
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tem passively accepts total spending as determined by the number who qualify. 
This leads to a natural decomposition of  change in spending into change per 
capita and change in population weights. Shoven, Topper, and Wise calculate 
part  of  this decomposition: the change in  government  spending  on transfer 
programs that will result from changes in the age distribution of the population, 
holding constant per capita spending on each program. 
The age distribution is expected to change rather dramatically, so we should 
expect rather large changes in government spending because of the importance 
of age-related programs. Indeed, Shoven, Topper, and Wise find that “the cost 
increase per adult is projected to be about 25%.”  Almost all of this is due to 
the increased costs of programs that benefit the elderly: about half comes from 
Social Security benefits  and the rest from Medicare and Medicaid  and from 
other federal government retirement programs (primarily civil service and mil- 
itary  pensions).  Shoven, Topper, and Wise conclude  that  “these projections 
have serious consequences. First, . . . there will be strong pressures to cut the 
benefits of  these programs.. . . Second, new initiatives with budgetary costs 
will be crowded out by the growing expense of the existing programs.” 
I agree with their conclusion, but not because of their analysis. In fact, with 
a small modification, their analysis leads to optimistic conclusions. The modi- 
fication is to allow income growth, which they exclude from their calculations. 
Suppose, for example, real GNP grows by  1 percent per year per capita. Then 
Social Security benefits as a percentage  of  GNP will fall from 5.0 percent in 
1990 to 4.8 percent in 2020, so that the burden of transferring Social Security 
benefits through the tax system will decrease, not increase. Because the Medi- 
care, Medicaid,  and federal  retirement programs  increase at about the same 
rate as Social Security benefits, they will similarly decline as a percentage of 
GNP and, therefore, so will total government spending on these programs as a 
percentage of GNP. 
Expert Panel Projections 
The rest of my comments will be based on a report published by the  1991 
Advisory Council on Social Security (1991). The council convened an expert 
panel to study the implications of the demographic change on income security 
and health-care expenditures. The panel produced a number of spending pro- 
jections to 2020. I will take some examples from the panel’s report and com- 
pare them with some results of Shoven, Topper, and Wise. 
Table 1C. 1 shows several categories of expenditures and transfers. The pro- 
jection of  Social Security benefits is based on a detailed projection model of 
the Office of the Actuary of  the Social Security Administration.  Health-care 
expenditures  are the percentage  of  GNP spent on health  care regardless  of 
payment source. The projection  is a modification  of  that of Shoven, Topper, 
and Wise: it reflects age-composition changes and per capita GNP growth. It 
is an aggregate of  18 kinds of health-care expenditures by age; an example is 
inpatient care in community hospitals, which varies by age. The projection of 35  The Impact of the Demographic Transition on Government Spending 
Table lC.l  Current and Projected Expenditures (% of GNP) 
I990  2020 
Social Security retirement benefits  4.6  5.8 
Health care  12.2  13.7a 
Federal government purchases  7.1  6.2 
State and local education  5.2  4.5 
Total  29.7  30.2 
Source: Advisory Council on Social Security (1991). 
"Based  only on changes in age composition and per capita GNP growth. 
federal government purchases is based on expert judgement. The method of 
projecting educational expenses is similar to the method of Shoven, Topper, 
and Wise. Educational expenses fall because of the decline in the fraction of 
school-age population. The expert panel considered other uses of  GNP, such 
as investment, but they are not sensitive to the age distribution, so I have not 
listed them. 
The table shows a modest rise in the total. The conclusion is that at least 
until 2020 the change in age distribution is manageable. Between 2020 and 
2030, the fraction of the population over age 65 increases further, but the same 
overall conclusion remains. 
Table 1C.  1 allows no change in per capita health-care expenditures except 
from income growth. However, over the past 20 years real per capita health- 
care expenditures have risen at an annual rate of 4.4 percent, which is much 
greater than the rate of  GNP growth. A continuation of such rates of growth 
will have major impacts on Medicare and Medicaid and on the economic status 
of the elderly. 
At the request.  of the expert panel, the Health Care Financing Administration 
(HCFA) constructed four scenarios for future health-care expenditures. The 
projections are based on forecasts of  18 kinds of health-care use. Expenditures 
on each kind can change because  of  demographic changes, changes in fre- 
quency of use, changes in intensity of use, and medical inflation in excess of 
general inflation. 
Table  1C.2 gives an outline of  the  scenarios and the percentage  of  GNP 
spent on health care under each scenario. The expert panel focused on scenar- 
ios 2 and 3. Both show an increase in the percentage of GNP spent on health 
care  that  completely  dominates  any  changes  associated  with  demographic 
shifts (scenario 4). Both require a very large shift in the composition of total 
consumption from 12.2 percent of  GNP in  1990 to 31.5 percent or 22.7 per- 
cent. Under scenario 2, all of  the personal income growth between now and 
2020 would be  spent on health care, and under scenario 3, 69 percent of  it 
would be. 
It is hard to believe that health-care expenditures will grow from 12.2 per- 
cent of GNP to 22.7 percent or possibly even 3 1.5 percent; yet, it is difficult to 36  John B. Shoven, Michael D. Topper, and David A. Wise 
Table 1C.2  Four Scenarios of Health-Care Expenditures in 2020 
Scenario 
I  2  3  4 
Growth rates ('7)  Same real growth  Modest reductions  Moderate reductions in  Demographic and 
per capita as  in growth rates;  growth rates; per  GNP growth 
last 10 years  per capita  capita growth = 3.1  only 
(4.7)  growth same as 
last 20 years 
(4.4) 
Expenditures  36.0  31.5  22.7  13.7 
(% of  GNP) 
Source: Advisory  Council on Social Security (1991). 
identify the mechanisms that will prevent such growth. One possibility is that 
a substantial fraction  of  the population  will, because  of  costs, have limited 
access to the health-care system. In 1990, the elderly paid about 17 percent of 
their median income on medical expenses.' Under  scenarios 2 and 3, this is 
expected to rise to 30 percent  and 23 percent,  respectively.  Real  per capita 
payments by private health-care insurers are projected to increase by factors of 
3.2 and 2.3, which will threaten employment-based  health-care coverage be- 
cause of the expenses to employers. 
The results of  Shoven, Topper, and Wise, when normalized by GNP growth, 
show a fall in the tax burden;  but according  the HCFA projections,  the per 
capita cost will substantially increase the tax burden. In 1990, the federal gov- 
ernment's  share of  Medicare (HI and SMI) amounted to 4.4 percent  of  the 
taxable Social Security payroll. Under scenarios 2 and 3, this is expected to 
increase to  17.6 percent and  12.5 percent, respectively. Either of these is, of 
course, a very large increase in the tax burden. 
Conclusion 
The effects  of  population  aging through  2020 seem manageable:  the  in- 
crease in transfers through the Social Security system are within historical vari- 
ation; health-care costs associated  with the demographic change do increase 
but not alarmingly; although not discussed here, the private pension  system 
should be able to pay for the greater number of  retirees. By far the most im- 
portant problem is the escalation of health-care costs. This is associated with 
the demographic change because of an interaction effect: the elderly consume 
health-care services much more intensely than the nonelderly. The force driv- 
ing the escalation, however, is not the age distribution of the population. The 
large projected increases in health-care costs come from inflation of medical 
1. This figure includes payments for SMI premiums but not for any privately purchased health 
insurance. 37  The Impact of the Demographic Transition on Government Spending 
costs in  excess of  general inflation, increased use per person, and increased 
intensity  (higher cost per use). The expert panel  concluded  that  immediate 
action is required  to contain  costs and that  increasing costs will  reduce  the 
access of many to the health-care system. 
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